Junta Directiva en la empresa familiar y su impacto en la riqueza socioemocional by Moreno Gómez, Jorge Isaac et al.
Board of director in the family business and its 
impact on socioemotional wealth 
Junta Directiva en la empresa familiar y su impacto en la riqueza 
socioemocional 
Jorge Isaac MORENO-GÓMEZ 1, Gonzalo GÓMEZ-BETANCOURT 2, José BETANCOURT 
Ramirez 3 




2. Theoretical framework and proposal development 
3. Methodology 





This study seeks to determine the impact of 
the implementation of good corporate 
governance practices on the family business 
Board of Directors, observing the impact on 
the family socioemotional wealth. Using four 
cases study from family businesses in 
Colombia-South America, the results show 
that the implementations of corporate 
governance practices in the Board of 
Directors have strong tendencies to preserve 
the family's socioemotional wealth. 
Furthermore, unity, honesty, transparency and 
amity are factors boosting both family and 
business success.  
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 RESUMEN: 
Este estudio busca determinar el impacto de 
la implementación de las buenas prácticas de 
gobierno corporativo en la Junta Directiva de 
las empresas familiares, observando el 
impacto sobre la riqueza socio-emocional de 
la familia. El uso de cuatro casos de estudio 
de empresas familiares en Colombia, Sur 
América, los resultados muestran que las 
implementaciones de prácticas de gobierno 
corporativo en la Junta Directiva tienen 
fuertes tendencias en preservar la riqueza 
socio-emocional de la familia. Por otra parte, 
la unidad, la honestidad, la transparencia y la 
amistad son factores que influyen tanto el 
éxito de la familia y los negocios. 
Palabras clave: Empresa Familiar, Riqueza 
socio-emocional, Colombia 
1. Introduction 
Family businesses (FB) [4] are the most predominant form of business organization in the 
world, and contribute greatly to the creation of global wealth (IFERA, 2003). In the United 
States, accounting for 95% of all enterprises (Shanker and Astrachan, 1996), produces 
between 40% and 60% of GDP and accounts for 57% of jobs (Astrachan and Shanker, 
2003). In Colombia is estimated to contribute over 50% of GDP and 70% of employment 
(Cala, 2005) and represent 70% of the country's businesses (Superintendencia de 
Sociedades, 2006). 
Contributions related to FB corporate governance have grown significantly in the last 
decade (Benavides Velasco, Guzmán Parra and Quintana García, 2011).  One of the topics 
mostly included in the research on corporate governance is the codes of good governance 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), however for FB this topic have not been developed 
yet. 
 The codes of good governance include a set of principles, standards or good practices 
related to internal business management (Gregory, 2002). The research linking good 
corporate governance practices with socioemotional wealth are scarce. Mitchell, Agle and 
Wood (1997) suggests that the association of a family with the ownership, governance and 
management of a company will give it the power and legitimacy to influence on the goals 
of the organization. Some researchers argue that family involvement will lead to different 
individual goals and results of organizational performance (Chrisman, Chua and Sharma, 
2005; Dyer, 2006), such as family harmony, identity and family social status (Gomez-
Mejía, Haynes, Nuñez-Nickel, Jacobson and Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Zellweger and 
Astrachan, 2008). In addition, the preservation of socioemotional wealth includes common 
goals for the family, as the transfer of the company to the next generation (Gomez-Mejía et 
al., 2007), providing employment to family members (Gomez-Mejía, Nuñez-Nickel, and 
Gutierrez, 2001), reputation and recognition by the community (Dyer and Whetten, 2006). 
Corporate governance is a broad topic within academic research and governance models 
developed for large public corporations with disperse ownership cannot be automatically 
applied to the FB context where a wide range of businesses and families add complexity. 
The existing FB governance structures with regard to family, ownership and governance 
play a significant role as they define specific functions, accountability, rights and 
autonomy. Therefore, when the Colombian FB Board of Director implemented good 
corporate governance practices, their impact will be reflected in the preservation of the 
socioemotional wealth. 
We contribute to literature by studying first time codes inside the context of FB and 
provides better understanding of how good corporate governance practices implemented in 
the Board of Directors can help their survival and successful. The objective of this paper is 
to determine the impact of the implementation of Corporate Governance practices in the 
Board of Directors, while observing the impact on family socioemotional wealth. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second part is dedicated to 
presenting theoretical framework and derived our propositions. The third part explains the 
research design and methodology. The cross-analysis are found in the fourth part. Finally, 
conclusions and limitations are presented. 
2. Theoretical framework and proposal development 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
This paper has taken the Stewardship Theory as theoretical framework. The model of a man 
according to Stewardship Theory is based on the assumption that the steward's behavior 
will benefit the organization because he/she thinks a collectivist behavior has higher utility 
that an individualistic or self-serving behavior. That is, the steward's collectivist behavior 
seeks to reach the objectives of the organization (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). 
The Stewardship Theory has been identified by researchers as potentially applicable to the 
FB field because of its management philosophy directed towards participation, solid 
identification, little use of institutional power, and social and personal growth (Corbetta and 
Salvato, 2004a; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Miller, Le Breton-Miller 
and  Scholnick, 2008).  
Researchers conducting investigations on Stewardship Theory assume there is a strong 
relationship between the success of the company and the principal's satisfaction (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), and this means good alignment of principal's and agent's 
interests (Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007) 
According to Miller et al., (2008) the Steward (manager) may adopt three common aspects 
within the FB context; continuity, community and connection. Continuity is related to 
longevity of the business rather than to long-term benefits (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). 
Continuity leads to community or the creation of a collective corporate culture (Miller and 
Le Breton-Miller, 2006), and connection is the result of strong relationships with external 
groups (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). 
Furthermore, the assumptions underlying the Stewardship Theory are identified with some 
features or attributes that have been found in the FB. For instance, a high level of 
commitment (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), trust between family members (Coleman, 
1990) and long-term orientation (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006), among others, are part 
of the relations among family members, relations between family and business, supporting 
the implementation of good corporate governance practices that can positively contribute to 
the preservation of the socioemotional wealth. 
2.2 Proposal development 
2.2.1 Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors (BD) is the most important element in the corporate governance 
system. Its main function is serving as a link between owners and General Management in 
order to guide, supervise and advise the relationship the latter has with the other interested 
parties (Ward and Handy, 1988). 
In the FB research context, BD governance matters have received great interest (Hoy and 
Verser, 1994; Zahra and Sharma, 2004), reflected on the researchers' concerns about 
survival and sustainability. Similarly, researchers highlight the role of BDs for their 
potential contribution to business performance and the continuity of FBs (Corbetta and 
Salvato, 2004a; Lester and Cannella, 2006). 
The BD plays an important part in limiting discretion of parents-owners-managers to 
prevent their self-control issues from undermining the feasibility of the FB (Chrisman et al., 
2004; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz, 2001). 
From the Stewardship Theory perspective, BDs place more emphasis on the Board's 
advisory tasks than on control tasks (Davis et al., 1997). Researchers have indicated that 
these Board tasks are characterized by participative management philosophies, strong 
identification with the company, little dependence on institutional powers, and social and 
personal fulfillment (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004b; Miller and Le Breton -Miller 2006; 
Miller et al., 2008). 
Studies on the BD mainly focusing on advisory tasks found that the stronger the family's 
identification and the commitment to the company, most participation of affiliated members 
on the Board, which is supposed to be an advantage when providing advice, due to the 
close relationship with the company and the family (Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007). 
Additionally, advice provided by the Board members helps to improve quality and 
commitment to FB strategic decisions (Mustakallio, Autio, and Zahra, 2002). 
However, Bammens, Voodeckers, and Van Gils, (2008) use the need for advice provided 
by the Board as a measure, and find that this need decreases from the first to the second 
generation (explained by increased experience in family business) and increases again in 
the third generation (explained by the prevalence of family conflicts). Furthermore, 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) indicate that families operating under the Agency Theory model 
tend to appoint affiliated parties as Board members, not because of their qualifications, but 
because of their lack of independence, which facilitates expropriation of family wealth. 
Researchers indicate that control exercised over the Board makes members' intrinsic 
motivation toward pro-organizational behavior decrease, while opportunistic tendencies 
increase in those domains not properly controlled (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004b; Davis et 
al., 1997).  Therefore, they place emphasis on the value of Board activities that nurture 
members and managers and their effort in support of the organization, through one of the 
most important tasks of the Board: providing advice and counseling (Davis et al., 1997; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). 
Family businesses are less likely than non-family businesses to pursue financial 
performance as their sole or even their main goal (Chrisman et al., 2003; Gómez-Mejía et 
al., 2007). Nonfinancial goals or socioemotional goals include among others: preservation 
of the family-owned business, family employment and family traditions and harmony 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Jones, Makri, and Gomez-Mejia, 2008; Voordeckers, Van Gils 
and Van den Heuvel, 2007). That is, the ability of Board members to provide resources 
allowing preservation of the family's socioemotional wealth. In view of the above, the 
following proposal has been proposed: 
P1: The implementation of good corporate governance practices by the Board of Directors 
helps to preserve socioemotional wealth. 
2.2.2. Outsides members 
The idea that BD in any kind of company should include outside members, supposedly 
independent of management, is not new. Moreover, the idea that the Chair of the BD should 
be an outside member has gained support as an internal management mechanism to 
guarantee total independence of the Board (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides, 
2000). 
Even though the importance of the Board independence cannot be denied, there is not a 
general consensus as to the definition of independence (Brennan and McDermott, 2004). 
However, in spite of the lack of consensus regarding the definition of outside members, this 
corporate governance practice is still highly recommended and should be implemented by 
the company in an effort to improve the Board of Directors efficiency (Kang, Chen and 
Gray, 2007). Researchers have evidenced that outside board members contribute with their 
experience and objectivity and help minimize management entrenchment and expropriation 
(Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). Bacon (1985) suggested that outside 
members are impartial with regard to the projects evaluated by the company, the acquisition 
of other businesses or the evaluation of trade relations between companies. 
In FBs, outside members form one of the main lines of defense external or minority 
shareholders can use in order to protect their rights from the influence and power of large 
shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). To improve business performance, outside 
members can potentially prevent families from expropriating the company's resources by 
means of excessive compensation, special dividends or unjustified perks. Moreover, outside 
members may impose structural restrictions on the family by limiting their involvement in 
important Board subcommittees such as the audit committee, the investment committee, the 
nominating committee and the compensation committee (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). 
Acting as stewards, families may place outside members on the Board to provide industry 
expertise and knowledge, give objective advice, and act as advocates for the company and 
its viability. Outside members may play an important role in the development of strategic 
change processes in FBs (Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, and Dennis, 2000; Voordeckers et al., 
2007).  
Furthermore, the involvement of outside members on the BD might be beneficial to the FB, 
because they may be able to differentiate between the company and the family context, thus 
favoring separation of corporate objectives and family decisions. Outside members promote 
the adoption of control and advice mechanisms to face business complexity and growth 
(Chittor and Das, 2007; Reid and Adams, 2001). However, delegating responsibility to 
outside members might result in a decrease in family control over strategic decisions, an 
increase in information asymmetry between stewards and owners, and conflicts between 
family and non-family members with regard to the vision and objectives of the company 
(Gómez-Mejía, Cruz, Berrone, and De Castro, 2011). In other words, the presence of 
outside members could start questioning family members' socioemotional wealth (Gómez-
Mejía, et al., 2007), thus challenging family control over the company. 
According to Gómez-Mejía et al., (2011), for family members, preservation of 
socioemotional wealth replaces all the financial advantages that could result from the 
involvement of outside members on the BD. Preserving socioemotional wealth through 
maintaining a good reputation and projecting a positive family image seems to prevail over 
the advantages offered by outside members on the BD and the pursuit of financial goals.  
In view of the above, the following proposal has been proposed: 
P2: The involvement of outside members on the Board of Directors in FBs affect preserve 
socioemotional wealth. 
2.2.3. Separating the roles of Chair of the Board of Directors and CEO 
Due to recent accounting scandals worldwide (WorldCom, Tyco, among others), investors 
have become more concerned with regard to corporate governance in all kinds of 
organizations (Kang et al., 2007). This has revitalized the debate on the relationship 
between role duality when the same person holds the Chair of the Board and the CEO 
Manager Position, and business performance (Boyd, 1995; Desai, Kroll and Wright, 2003). 
According to good governance practices guidelines, the separation of roles seeks to prevent 
the concentration of power, to the detriment of appropriate management supervision, 
because the Chair of the Board of Directors and the CEO have different and complementary 
roles. 
Empirical evidence has documented a tendency to significantly reduce the dual role of 
Chair of the Board of Directors and CEO of large listed companies (Braun and Sharma, 
2007). Recent studies in the United States show the dual role of Chair of the Board of 
Directors and CEO decreased from 76% (Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian, 2002), to 62% 
(Booth et al., 2002), and reached 58,3% (Linck, Netter and Yang., 2008). Similarly, Lasfer 
(2006) found that it has reached 22% in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, in the 
Egyptian context, the dual role of Chair of the Board of Directors and Manager is about 
76% (Elsayed, 2007, 2010). 
The Stewardship Theory states that the duality of the roles of Chair of the Board of 
Directors and CEO anticipates an additional strategic benefit arising from the control unit. 
When the same person holds the positions of Manager and Chairperson, the decision-
making process takes less time, leadership is not ambiguous and actions are facilitated 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). In such cases, as suggested by the Stewardship Theory, the 
company would unify control under one person, who could be a family member in charge 
of representing the interests of all the business owners through effective management in the 
long run. The dual role of Chair of the Board of Directors and CEO, performed by a family 
member, has a great impact on the company's culture, strategic vision, values and 
objectives (Athanassiou, Crittenden, Kelley and Márquez, 2002; Tagiuri and Davis, 1992). 
A possible explanation to this statement is that in case of duality, ownership and control 
over the company are usually in his/her hands. Because of this concentration of power, the 
family member has broad discretion to act and is able to pursue objectives different from 
those of a company that maximizes benefits (Chrisman et al., 2004; Gedajlovic, Lubatkin 
and Schulze, 2004). 
The emotional connection, the identification with the company and profits resulting from 
the ability to exercise authority are stronger when the company is controlled and managed 
by the founding family (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003a). 
Similarly, those family members who serve as Chair of the BD and CEO promote 
preservation of the company's socioemotional wealth. Therefore, in order to prevent loss of 
socioemotional wealth caused by potential agency problems with non-family interested 
parties, the following proposal has been proposed: 
P3: The separation of the roles of Chair of Board of Directors and CEO has a negative 
impact on the preservation of socioemotional wealth. 
2.3 Socioemotional Wealth 
The existing literature on the FB research field has clearly shown that financial 
performance is not the only objective FBs have (Zellweger and Nason, 2008), and that they 
often express a strong preference for non-economic performance (Astrachan and Jaskiewicz 
2008; Chrisman et al., 2003), as well as for the socioemotional wealth of the business 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Researchers refer to non-financial goals and socioemotional 
wealth, aspects that are emotionally associated with the affective dimension of the family, 
including protection of family ties, family unity, commitment, perpetuation of the family 
dynasty, relationships with employees, social reputation, identity, and so on. 
The concept of socioemotional wealth is based on the model developed by Gómez-Mejía et 
al., (2007), and is founded on the notion that companies make decisions depending on the 
reference point of the company's dominant directors. This model suggests that FBs are 
usually motivated and committed to preserving the family's affective needs, such as the 
identity, the ability to exercise family influence and the perpetuation of the family dynasty 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). In view of the above, the earnings or losses regarding the 
preservation of the family's socioemotional wealth become the fundamental reference 
framework used by family-controlled companies in order to make significant strategic 
decisions as well as policy-related decisions.  
To measure the family's socioemotional wealth, we will use the construct proposed by 
Berrone, Cruz and Gómez-Mejía, (2012) FIBER (according to its acronym in English). This 
construct consists of the following dimensions: family control and influence, identification 
of family members with the company, the company's social ties, emotional attachment of 
family members, and renewal of family bonds with the company, through succession.  
3. Methodology 
We employed case studies in our study. Our motivation converged with Yin (2003) insight 
that this method is appropriate to uncover social dynamics obtaining a "why" and "how" 
character. In order to conform to the hallmarks of a methodically rigorous case study, we 
designed the case study in accordance with several measures. Gibbert and colleagues 
(2008) find that external, construct, and internal validity as well as reliability constitutes the 
essential measures employed. We reflect about each of these measures in the following 
while attempting to deliver a sound understanding of the case studies' properties. 
3.1. Case selection 
To conduct the research, four (4) second-generation Colombian family businesses (see 
Table 1), were selected from different economic sectors (services, manufacturing), and 
different size in accordance with Law 455 of 2011 [5] (see Table 2). The final sample 
consists of four cases (two medium and two small size companies) and is consistent with 
the four-to-ten case scale proposed by case study development methodology (Eisenhardt, 
1989), deemed appropriate to reach theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Table 1. Case description 
Company Description 
Saturn The company Saturn is a second-generation family company, leader in the manufacture and sale of 
social expression and entertainment. The company was founded in 1964. Ownership of the 
company is equally shared between seven brothers, represented through seven companies. The 
company has a Board of Directors composed of five (5) members, meeting four to five times per 
year. The Board composition: two independent members (unrelated to the family or the company), 
two family members working in the company and a family member non-related to the company. 
Mars The company Mars is a second-generation family company, leader in the food and beverage 
economic sector. The company was founded in 1969. Ownership of the company is held by two 
family companies. The company does not have a Board of Directors. However, the functions 
conferred to the Board are held by the Management Committee formed by five (5) members: an 
administrative manager, a production manager, the accountant and the two owners. 
Júpiter The company Jupiter is a second-generation family business, a leader in the provision of passenger 
land transport. The company was founded in 1961. Ownership of the company is concentrated in 
Orion family, with a share of 72%, who have control over the company. The company Jupiter has a 
Board composed by five (5) members, meeting once a month. The Board consists of four members 
of mentioned family and a fifth one belonging to the family with the second highest ownership 
percentage. 
Mercury Mercury is the company created in 1936; It began operating under the name "Mercury Workshop" 
and entered the Colombian market as a pioneer in the manufacturing of equipment for milling and 
rice processing. Ownership of the company is held by four families.  The company Mercury has a 
Board of Directors. However, nowadays, the Board merely plays a role on warranting the important 
decisions taken within the senior management team. 
Source: Prepared from information supplied by the company 
3.2. Data collection 
Information was collected taking advantage of three sources: semi -structured interviews, 
direct observation, revision of documents and archives. This is to show the reality of FB 
and to enable the participation of its members, which particularly backs up the findings, 
meaning and relevance of the studied topic. Even when the information gathered by the 
interviews is the main source, triangulation of information has been made from different 
sources as a basis for its validity. Additionally, the study made use of confidential 
information through BD documents, as a way to enhance and corroborate the evidence of 
the interviews. 
Semi- structured interviews were made by people who met with the following: family 
members, owners and members of the Board according to the research questions. 
3.3. Analysis of information 
One of the challenges with regard to multiple-case research is how to stay within the spatial 
limits while conveying the emergent theory, which is the research objective, and the varied 
empirical evidence supporting the theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Therefore, an 
approach as described by Yin (2003) has been adopted, where there is an individual section 
for each corporate governance practice in each FB dimension, as particularly developed for 
each case in the previous chapter. 
Based on the foregoing, a cross-case analysis is carried out using information on individual 
cases. In brief, a comparison between the case that has implemented good corporate 
governance practices to a considerable extent and the case that has implemented them to a 
lesser extent is made, and in this way, the three (3) proposals brought forward are then 
validated. A summary of the final assessment for each case can be found in Table 2. 
4. Cross-case analysis 
4.1. Board of Directors 
The main role of the BD, according to the Stewardship Theory, is to advise members 
during the decision-making process (Davis et al., 1997). Nevertheless, this study shows that 
sometimes the role performed by the BD is that of endorsing decisions made by top 
management. 
For this research, the BD of the companies analyzed consist mostly of business-owning 
family members, and this facilitates the alignment of family and corporate objectives, as 
well as the strategic decision-making process. Additionally, taking into consideration the 
number of Board members, these could be regarded as small (five members on average), 
which facilitates a faster and unanimous decision-making process. However, the fact that 
the Boards consist of business-owning family members allows them to make strategic 
decisions aimed at giving priority to preserve the socioemotional wealth.  
The BD of the companies analyzed show a high degree of alignment between the interests 
of the owners and those of the stewards. Moreover, the role of steward is played either by a 
family member or by an affiliate member. The foregoing has been confirmed by the 
research conducted by Jaskiewicz and Klein (2007), who found that the stronger the 
family's identification and the commitment to the company, the more affiliated and inside 
members on the Board. 
On the other hand, those family members on the Board might have an influence on the 
strategic decisions of the company, because reaching nonfinancial goals in order to meet 
family needs prevails. Reaching objectives helps build trust among family members, thus 
promoting cohesion, well-being, harmony and socio-emotional wealth preservation. In view 
of the above, proposal P1 which suggested that the implementation of good corporate 
governance practices by the BD helps preserve socioemotional wealth is considered 
validated.  
Outside Members  
The cases studied show a Board consisting mainly of family members (Westhead, Cowling 
and Howorth, 2001: Voordeckers et al., 2007) who are committed to the company. 
Moreover, the involvement of the family in ownership and stewardship leads to less 
divergent objectives  between the family and the company. Consequently, a high degree of 
alignment of the objectives suggests there is less need for outside directors (Jaskiewicz and 
Klein, 2007). 
Additionally, owners seek the presence of trustworthy and competent people in the 
company in order to provide support and advice to management. That means that inside 
directors have advantages over outside candidates, because they are a source of knowledge 
about the company (Raheja, 2005), and family members trust them and are aware of their 
values 
Table 2. Socioemotional in Family Business from the perspective of interviewers 




The power of the 
company is held by 
the seven owners. 
Control is exercised 
by presenting the 
duality of functions 
between the Chairman 
of the Board and 
General Manager of 
the company headed 
by the elder brother. 
The power of the 
company is held by 
the two brothers at the 
General Shareholders 
Meeting. Control is 
exercised to be owners 
in the two main 
management positions 
in the company and in 
the Board of Directors 
Orion family has 
control in making 
strategic decisions for 
the company. The 
power of the Orion 
family is reflected by 
having 72% 
ownership of the 
company and has 80% 
of its members on the 
Board. 
The power of the company is 
represented by the 16 
members of the family 
shareholders. The control is 
exercised by presenting the 
duality of functions between 
the Chairman of the Board 
and CEO of the member 
company's second 
generation. In addition, 
commercial vice president, 
financial and administrative 
vice president and Innovation 
Management are held by 







Family members feel 
a total commitment to 
the company and they 
are proud of the 
success and of 
belonging to an FB 
Owners believe that 
family members have 
a strong sense of 
belonging, mainly 
those who are 
financially dependent 
on the company and 
believe that family 
members feel the 
success of the 
company as their own, 
as the contributions 
that each member 
performs in the 
company 
Family members feel 
a total commitment to 
the company and they 
are proud of the 
success and of 
belonging to an EF 
The family members are 
proud and have a sense of 




It considers that the 
level of satisfaction 
and identification of 
employees with the 








The owners are active in 
community service focusing 
primarily on the welfare of 
their employees and then 
company is not what 
the owners want and 
believes it can be 
improved. 
employees in order to 
improve their quality 
of life 
different programs, 
offered to employees 
and their children 
external community. Also 
they carry out activities with 
communities closest to the 
organizational environment, 
supporting external 





The owners claim that 
affective family 
considerations are 
more important than 
economic; family first 
and then company 
The owners claim that 
affective 
considerations are as 
important as economic 
considerations. The 
brothers agree that you 
cannot look at 
everything with the 
coldness of numbers 
The owners claim that 
affective family 
considerations are 
more important than 
economic ones, 
however always 
generating a respect 
towards economic part 
considering that both 
must be closely 
linked. 
The owners felt the 
emotional considerations are 
more important than 
economic considerations, "try 
to silence feelings with 






Owners have the firm 
intention to transfer 
the business to the 
third generation 
The owners have no 
plans to sell the 
company, but are in 
the search for strategic 
partners to enable 
them to grow the 
company and develop 
their potential 
The owners say they 
have not considered 
the possibility of 
selling the company 
The owners have no plans to 
sell the company.  
Source: Prepared from information supplied by the company 
The BD of the companies under study consists mainly of inside directors and business-
owning family members. BD consisting of business-owning family members usually have a 
strong influence when setting and implementing corporate objectives (Tagiuri and Davis, 
1992). Consequently, family-related goals such as keeping family control, harmony and 
well-being tend to be more important that business-related objectives. Involvement of 
outside members could be inconsistent with the preservation of socioemotional wealth of 
family members, because the first might only focus on business performance without taking 
into consideration family objectives. In view of the above, proposal P2 which suggested 
that involvement of outside members in the BD of FBs affects preserve socioemotional 
wealth is validated. 
Separation of the roles of Chair of the Board of Directors and CEO 
The good governance practice of separating the roles of the Chair of the Board and the 
CEO is not observed in the four cases analyzed. In the FBs studied, there is a significant 
concentration of power in the corporate governance structures; and this is reflected in the 
dual role played by the same person, in these cases, a business-owning family member. 
Nevertheless, this has not hindered the company's continuity and survival.  
On the other hand, the evidence supports the Stewardship Theory, which states that role 
duality is an advantage for both the company and the family, because less time is required 
during the decision-making    
process, power is unified and since one business-owning family member plays this role, 
this person is in charge of ensuring fulfillment of family goals and corporate goals. Role 
duality in the hands of a business-owning family member leads to the protection of family 
interests over corporate interests. This person is responsible for making strategic business 
decisions without opposing family needs, and sometimes, has to sacrifice business 
performance in order to protect family cohesion, harmony, well-being and socio-emotional 
wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). In view of the above, proposal P3 which suggested that 
the separation of the roles of Chair of the BD and CEO has a negative impact on the 
preservation of socio-emotional wealth is validated. 
5. Conclusions 
This research is based on a multiple-case study, regarded as the most suitable methodology 
to reach the objectives set, because it allows studying a phenomenon as a dynamic process, 
and within its real-life context. The case selection was carried out by using theoretical 
sampling, and those cases showing the best opportunity to learn about the phenomenon 
under study were chosen, because they are companies whose high quality products and 
services are recognized at a local, regional, national and international level. 
The aim of this research was to determine the impact that the implementation of good 
corporate governance practices has on FB governance structures, Board of Directors, on the 
socioemotional wealth of the family. 
The findings show that the role of the Board in the companies under study is different; 
many of them only use it in order to validate decisions already made, and in some other 
cases, to comply with legal provisions. 
On the other hand, One of the most important aspects identified in this study is the 
unlimited power that family members have over business ownership, control and 
management. This is evidenced by the active involvement of family members is all the 
governance structures of the enterprise. The companies analyzed have Boards consisting of 
five (5) directors on average, who are mainly business-owning family members. The 
findings are similar to those indicated by Corbetta and Montemerlo, (1999), in the United 
States and in Italy, where the Boards consisted of four members on average, and in Spain, 
six members on average (Suáre and Santana-Martin, 2004). 
These BD are controlled by family members and have the power to affect the strategic 
decision–making process of the company, which facilitates the alignment of corporate goals 
and family goals. This is consistent with the general view that family businesses tend to 
enjoy control (Suáre and Santana-Martin, 2004). The foregoing is evidenced by the unified 
message conveyed to all the family members, owners, employees, suppliers and the 
community, supporting the considerations of the Stewardship theory. 
The companies under study showed a significant presence of family and/or inside directors, 
which facilitated the alignment of family interests and corporate interests, and resulted in a 
positive effect on the strategic decision-making process. This type of director offers 
alternative perspectives and experience, and provides advisory and counseling services, 
according to the assumptions of the theory of Stewardship. 
The companies analyzed show a strong tendency to preserve the family's socio-emotional 
wealth. These companies display a dominant position during the strategic decision-making 
process of the organization (Chua et al.,, 1999; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003b), 
resulting from the concentration of ownership in the family and the control exercised over 
different governance structures of the company. Moreover, owners are not considering 
selling the company; quite the contrary, they are determined to keep the company in the 
hands of the family and continue their legacy from generation to generation. The foregoing 
statement has been supported by Zellweger and Astrachan (2008) and Zellweger, 
Kellermanns et al., (2012), who suggest that the act of transferring from generation to 
generation is one of the crucial aspects aimed at preserving socio-emotional wealth. 
 It could also be concluded that affective considerations are much more important that 
financial considerations, provided that they do not oppose principles, policies, family 
values and corporate values. Additionally, family members are aware that there should be a 
balance between corporate objectives and family objectives. Said balance is important for 
the company to survive and for good relationships among family members, which 
contributes to cohesion and harmony (Gómez, 2010). 
Along the same lines, the companies show commitment to corporate social responsibility, 
mainly to their employees, by giving them the opportunity to improve their quality of life 
and being supportive as to their families' education. This supports the collectivist vision 
Stewardship Theory. Also, they give support to the community, especially in the area where 
the company is located. 
On the other hand, the evidence showed that regardless of the implementation of good 
corporate governance practices for the FB Board of Directors, there are other factors that 
contribute to the survival of the company, such as respect, love, harmony, cohesion, 
commitment, values, beliefs and the particular behavior of each member (Gallo and Amat, 
2003), as fundamental pillars to build relationships among family members and family-
business.   This is in agreement with Gallo and Tomaselli (2006) who stated that these 
factors become strengths for the continuity and survival of a family business. Moreover, the 
vision that business-owning family members share facilitates the alignment of family goals 
and corporate goals. It also works as a mechanism to substitute the implementation of 
corporate governance practices in the course of this research. 
 Finally, it should be noted that the companies that needed advisory services by an expert in 
the field of family business were more aware of the implications and effects that might 
arise when making decisions that could affect the balance of family-business relationship. 
Notwithstanding the strengths of our research, there are some limitations. The difficulty in 
establishing limits in regard to the subject matter under consideration, the nature of the 
social reality under study, and the relationship between the researcher and the individuals 
involved in the cases under study (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 2004). The lack of a data 
base on FBs at a national level makes it difficult to identify them. Moreover, the difficulty 
to gain access to the companies and the information does not allow an in-depth analysis; 
this is very sensitive information the companies use cautiously, hermetically and 
confidentially. 
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